The Battle of Chaeronea in Diodorus Siculus

The Battle of Chaeronea in Diodorus Siculus

Chaeronea is the site of the famous Battle of Chaeronea (338 BCE) Phillip II of Macedon's decisive defeat of the Greek city-states. At Chaeronea in Boeotia (north of Corinth) Phillip and his allies from Thessaly, Epirus, Aetolia, Northern Phocis and Locrian defeated the combined forces of Athens and Thebes. Phillip commanded the right wing while his eighteen-year old son, Alexander lead the left. Alexander is credited with breaking the Theban lines and winning the battle (he was also entrusted with negotiating a peace after the battle). The result of the the Battle of Chaeronea was the unification of the Greek city-states under Macedonian rule. It is cited by later historians as the first battle in which Alexander took part and where he showed, at the early age of eighteen, that military genius which would define his later campaigns and earn him the name Alexander the Great.

In the following excerpt, the historian Diodorus Siculus (1st century BCE) chronicles the famous Battle of Chaeronia of 338 BCE, in which Phillip II of Macedon, his son Alexander and their allies defeated the Greek forces of Athens and Thebes resulting in the unification of the Greek city-states under Macedonian rule. As Alexander's contribution to the battle has been disputed (he is traditionally credited with breaking the Theban lines and winning the battle) it is of interest to read an earlier historian's account of the battle:

In the year Charondas was first archon in Athens, Philip, King of Macedon, being already in alliance with many of the Greeks, made it his chief business to subdue the Athenians, and thereby with more ease control all Hellas. To this end he presently seized Elateia [a Phocian town commanding the mountain passes southward], in order to fall on the Athenians, imagining to overcome them with ease; since he conceived they were not at all ready for war, having so lately made peace with him. Upon the taking of Elateia, messengers hastened by night to Athens, informing the Athenians that the place was taken, and Philip was leading on his men in full force to invade Attica.

The Athenian magistrates in alarm had the trumpeters sound their warning all night, and the rumor spread with terrifying effect all through the city. At daybreak the people without waiting the usual call of the magistrate rushed to the assembly place. Thither came the officials with the messenger; and when they had announced their business, fear and silence filled the place, and none of the customary speakers had heart to say a word. Although the herald called on everybody "to declare their minds"—-as to what was to be done, yet none appeared; the people, therefore, in great terror cast their eyes on Demosthenes, who now arose, and bade them to be courageous, and forthwith to send envoys to Thebes to treat with the Boeotians to join in the defense of the common liberty; for there was no time (he said) to send an embassy for aid elsewhere, since Philip would probably invade Attica within two days, and seeing he must march through Boeotia, the only aid was to be looked for there.

The people approved of his advice, and a decree was voted that such an embassy should be sent. As the most eloquent man for the task, Demosthenes was pitched upon, and forthwith he hastened away [to Thebes. —-Despite past hostilities between Athens and Thebes, and the counter-arguments of Philip's envoys, Demosthenes persuaded Thebes and her Boeotian cities that their liberty as well as that of Athens was really at stake, and to join arms with the Athenians.] . .When Philip could not prevail on the Boeotians to join him, he resolved to fight them both. To this end, after waiting for reinforcements, he invaded Boeotia with about thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse.

Both armies were now ready to engage; they were equal indeed in courage and personal valor, but in numbers and military experience a great advantage lay with the king. For he had fought many battles, gained most of them, and so learned much about war, but the best Athenian generals were now dead, and Chares—-the chief of them still remaining—-differed but little from a common hoplite in all that pertained to true generalship. About sunrise [at Chaeronea in Boeotia] the two armies arrayed themselves for battle. The king ordered his son Alexander, who had just become of age, yet already was giving clear signs of his martial spirit, to lead one wing, though joined to him were some of the best of his generals. Philip himself, with a picked corps, led the other wing, and arranged the various brigades at such posts as the occasion demanded. The Athenians drew up their army, leaving one part to the Boeotians, and leading the rest themselves.

At length the hosts engaged, and the battle was fierce and bloody. It continued long with fearful slaughter, but victory was uncertain, until Alexander, anxious to give his father proof of his valor—-and followed by a courageous band—-was the first to break through the main body of the enemy, directly opposing him, slaying many; and bore down all before him—-and his men, pressing on closely, cut to pieces the lines of the enemy; and after the ground had been piled with the dead, put the wing resisting him in flight. The king, too, at the head of his corps, fought with no less boldness and fury, that the glory of victory might not be attributed to his son. He forced the enemy resisting him also to give ground, and at length completely routed them, and so was the chief instrument of the victory.

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Over one thousand Athenians fell, and two thousand were made prisoners. A great number of Boeotians, too, perished, and many more were captured by the enemy.

[After some boastful conduct by the king, thanks to the influence of Demades, an Athenian orator who had been captured], Philip sent ambassadors to Athens and renewed the peace with her [on very tolerable terms, leaving her most of her local liberties]. He also made peace with the Boeotians, but placed a garrison in Thebes. Having thus struck terror into the leading Greek states, he made it his chief effort to be chosen generalissimo of Greece. It being noised abroad that he would make war upon the Persians, on behalf of the Greeks, in order to avenge the impieties committed by them against the Greek gods, he presently won public favor over to his side throughout Greece. He was very liberal and courteous, also, to both private citizens and communities, and proclaimed to the cities that he wished to consult with them as to the common good.' Whereupon a general council [of the Greek cities] was convened at Corinth, where he declared his design of making war on the Persians, and the reasons he hoped for success; and therefore desired the Council to join him as allies in the war. At length he was created general of all Greece, with absolute power, and having made mighty preparations and assigned the contingents to be sent by each city, he returned to Macedonia where, soon after, he was murdered by Pausanius, a private enemy.


Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC)

The Battle of Chaeronea (Greek: Μάχη της Χαιρώνειας ) was fought in 338 BC, near the city of Chaeronea in Boeotia, between the forces of Philip II of Macedon and an alliance of some of the Greek city-states including Athens and Thebes. The battle was the culmination of Philip's campaign in Greece (339� BC) and resulted in a decisive victory for the Macedonians.

Philip had brought peace to a war-torn Greece in 346 BC, by ending the Third Sacred War, and concluding his ten-year conflict with Athens for supremacy in the north Aegean, by making a separate peace. Philip's much expanded kingdom, powerful army and plentiful resources now made him the de facto leader of Greece. To many of the fiercely independent Greek city-states, Philip's power after 346 BC was perceived as a threat to their liberty, especially in Athens, where the politician Demosthenes led efforts to break away from Philip's influence. In 340 BC Demosthenes convinced the Athenian assembly to sanction action against Philip's territories and to ally with Byzantium, which Philip was besieging. These actions were against the terms of their treaty oaths and amounted to a declaration of war. In summer 339 BC, Philip therefore led his army into Greece, prompting the formation of an alliance of Greek states opposed to him, led by Athens and Thebes.

After several months of stalemate, Philip finally advanced into Boeotia in an attempt to march on Thebes and Athens. Opposing him, and blocking the road near Chaeronea, was the allied Greek army, similar in size and occupying a strong position. Details of the ensuing battle are scarce, but after a long fight the Macedonians crushed both flanks of the allied line, which then dissolved into a rout.

The battle has been described as one of the most decisive of the ancient world. The forces of Athens and Thebes were destroyed, and continued resistance was impossible the war therefore came to an abrupt end. Philip was able to impose a settlement upon Greece, which all states accepted, with the exception of Sparta. The League of Corinth, formed as a result, made all participants allies of Macedon and each other, with Philip as the guarantor of the peace. In turn, Philip was voted as strategos (general) for a pan-Hellenic war against the Persian Empire, which he had long planned. However, before he was able to take charge of the campaign, Philip was assassinated, and the kingdom of Macedon and responsibility for the war with Persia passed instead to his son Alexander.


Arrian I.7.1-11

In This Chapter
Alexander marches against Thebes

Despite having to end his Thracian campaign prematurely, Alexander had done enough to ensure that Macedon’s northern borders would not be troubled for the rest of his reign.

He would not be so fortunate in regards the Greek city-states: they were always on the look out for an opportunity to rebel, and in Arrian’s Anabasis the first one to do so was Thebes.

The rebellion started when a group of rebels within the city invited likeminded exiles back home. Together, they murdered two Macedonian officers outside their garrison (established by Philip II in 338 BC following the Battle of Chaeronea) and persuaded the Theban Assembly to support their revolution.

The rebels employed a three point strategy to win the Assembly over.
They used slogans. Arrian describes how they made ‘play with the fine old slogans of ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’
Deceit. They claimed that Alexander had died in Illyria
Wish fulfilment. The rebels’ deceit worked because people wanted to believe that it was true

Alexander knew that if he let Thebes’ rebellion go unchecked, other city-states might follow. He may have had his head stuck in The Iliad but he was also a realist. So, he marched south at speed to confront the rebels.

Thirteen days later, Alexander entered Boeotia. The Thebans were taken back by the speed of his arrival. The rebels assured them, however, that the Alexander who had come was not Philip’s son but Alexander Lyncestis.

Arrian doesn’t tell us at which point the Thebans found out that Alexander son of Philip was still alive. On the fourteenth day after his departure from the north, however, Alexander arrived outside Thebes. There, Arrian tells us, he did not attack the city but paused so that the Thebans could have ‘a period of grace, should they wish to reconsider their disastrous decision’.

It would be easy to get carried away by Alexander’s kindness here but it was no doubt influenced by two practical concerns (a) a desire to avoid damaging his reputation among the Greeks by attacking a Greek city, and (b) a desire to rest his men in case fighting became necessary.

The rebels, however, were in no mood to turn back. Not only did they decline to reconsider but they sent out a large force of cavalry and infantry to attack the Macedonians. It managed to kill a few of the enemy before being chased back into the city.

The following day, Alexander moved his army to be closer to the Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea – ever since the murder of the two officers, the garrison had been under siege there. Then, Alexander stopped. He did not try to relieve the siege (the cadmea was surrounded by Theban palisades) or begin a general assault of the city. He still hoped, Arrian tells us, to end the rebellion peacefully.

And indeed, there were Thebans who wanted a return to Macedonian rule but the rebels were in too strong a position for the doves to make any headway. They ‘did everything in their power to press the people into war’.

Thoughts
‘making play with the fine old slogans‘ – Ouch. That’s proper sarcasm, there!
Something pointed out by the Notes in The Landmark Arrian – how Alexander, while in Illyria, knew what was going on in Thebes but the Thebans had no idea regarding where his army was or if he was leading it. That speaks to an impressive intelligence operation on Alexander’s part. The Notes say that Alexander had better intelligence than his rivals throughout his campaigns. I love spy stories so this is a really interesting angle for me.

Texts Used
Hammond, Martin (tr.) Arrian: Alexander the Great (Oxford, OUP, 2013)
Romm, James (ed.) The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander (New York, Pantheon, 2010)

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Philip's intervention in Greece

In 355 a dispute between Phocis and the neighbouring city-States for the control of Delphi brings the war in Central Greece. The conflict, caused by Thebes, involved soon Sparta and Athens, its eternal rivals then interested Thessaly and finally provoked the intervention of Philip of Macedon.
Such occasions were quite frequent in the Greek history, but this seemed sent from fate. Philip occupied Melon, last ally of Athens, and moved southwards. After a first defeat against the Phocians in Thessaly (Phocians that were defeated in 352), he was stopped at Thermopylae from Athenians and Spartans and stationed himself in Thrace: only his poor state of health saved thracian Chersonese and the Hellespont. The sense of fear and horror of the Athenian Oratory from this period is easily imaginable, but two things surprise historians, one positively and one negatively. The personal political revenges are anything but incredible in a period of crisis like this, however the clarity of their arguments is impressive. They attribute at the events the shape of inevitability, and their speeches appear as Athenian tragedy monologues. All the athenian speakers managed to express in the most dramatic way the surrending of all Greece in the hands of Philip. To condamn this behaviour, the greatest of them, Demosthenes, said: «if Philip would die you'll immediately arise another one!».

The lion of Chaeronea

But Philip did not die in 349 invaded Halkidiki and in the following year he destroyed its main city, Olynthus. In 346, with a treaty concluded in Athens (peace of Philocrates), the Athenians gave up forever any pretense on Amphipolis, while retaining the control on the East, in the Chersonese. Meanwhile, Philip was engaged in Thrace, where he penetrated one after one a series of strongholds. Reestablished peace in the area and cut off the Phocis from its sources of supply, Philip marched south again. In the games that were held at Delphi in 346, he emerged as President having taken control of Thessaly, he had the right to participate as a member of the Panhellenic Forum. He was now Governor of Thessaly. Cherso-blepte of Thrace was his vassal Messenia, Argos and Megalopolis, Elis (i.e. those territories and those cities which, finding themselves in the Peloponnese, feared Sparta) were its allies too. Finally, in 342, he chased from Epirus Aribba King of the Molossians, just to impose his wife's brother, Alexander.

From Epirus, Philip could control the Gulf of Corinth and the western trading routes. Little by little, he extended his Kingdom to the South. Athens's reaction was too late. All of Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly were now part of the Empire of Philip. He had founded the city of Philippopolis (now Plovdiv) and held control of the western coast of Greece as far as the river Acheron. In 340 the Athenians, assisted by Byzantium and from nearby Perinto, managed to make it independent of Euboea, hunting the pro-macedonian oligarchy that exercised the power. Philip marched immediately on Perinto and on Byzantium, but without achieving immediate success. He spent the winter in northeastern Thrace, waging battles against the Scythians on the Danube estuary, and the following year he returned to Greece. Once again the opportunity for him was given by a dispute arosed within the delphic Council. In 338 Philip invaded Central Greece, occupied the Thermopylae, fortified a city in Phocis and seized Amfissa and Naupactus on the Corinthian Gulf. Thebes and Athens, with some less potent ally, opposed to Philip, and in August of that year, allied armies decided to tackle him at Chaeronea in Boeotia.


Opposing forces

According to Diodorus, the Macedonian army numbered roughly 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, a figure generally accepted by modern historians. [31] [32] Philip took command of the right wing of the Macedonian army and placed his 18-year-old son Alexander (the future conqueror of the Persian Empire) in command of the left wing, accompanied by a group of Philip's experienced generals. [32]

The allied Greek army included contingents from Achaea, Corinth, Chalcis, Epidaurus, Megara and Troezen, with the majority of troops being supplied by Athens and Thebes. The Athenian contingent was led by the generals Chares and Lysicles, and the Thebans by Theagenes. No source provides exact numbers for the Greek army, although Justin suggests that the Greeks were "far superior in number of soldiers" [33] the modern view is that the numbers of the city states that fought were approximately equal to those of the Macedonians. [31] The Athenians took up positions on the left wing, the Thebans on the right, and the other allies in the centre. [34]


Diodorus of Sicily

δίκαιος ἦν ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τῶν λαφύρων καὶ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν τιμῶν τοὺς ἀνδραγαθήσαντας ἐξαιρέτοις δώροις, ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν νοσφιζόμενος. διὸ καὶ συνέβαινε τοὺς Λυσιτανοὺς 1 προθυμότατα συγκινδυνεύειν αὐτῷ, τιμῶντας οἱονεί τινα κοινὸν εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα.

2. Ὅτι ὁ Πλαύτιος ὁ ἑξαπέλεκυς στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων κακὸς προστάτης ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ ἐπαρχίᾳ· ἀνθ᾿ ὧν κατάκριτος ἐν τῇ πατρίδι γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ τεταπεινωκέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔφυγεν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης.

3. Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Συρίαν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ βασιλεὺς διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρηστος ὢν εἰς προστασίαν βασιλείας τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν ἐπέτρεψεν 2 Ἱέρακι καὶ Διοδότῳ.

4. Ὅτι Δημήτριος, τεταπεινωμένης τῆς κατ᾿ Αἴγυπτον βασιλείας, καὶ μόνος ἀπολειφθεὶς ἀπολελύσθαι διέλαβεν ἑαυτὸν παντὸς κινδύνου. διόπερ τῆς συνήθους τοῖς ὄχλοις ἀρεσκείας καταφρονήσας καὶ βαρύτερος ἀεὶ μᾶλλον τοῖς προστάγμασι γινόμενος ἀπέσκηψεν εἰς ὠμότητα τυραννικὴν καὶ ποικίλων ἀνομημάτων ὑπερβολάς. αἰτία δ᾿ ἦν αὐτῷ


Contents of the Eleventh Book

On the crossing of Xerxes into Europe (chaps. 1–4).

On the battle of Thermopylae (chaps. 5–H).

On the naval battle which Xerxes fought against the Greeks (chaps. 12–13).

How Themistocles outgeneralled Xerxes and the Greeks conquered the barbarians in the naval battle of Salamis (chaps. 14–18).

How Xerxes, leaving Mardonius behind as commander, withdrew with a portion of his army to Asia (chap. 19).

How the Carthaginians with great armaments made war upon Sicily (chaps. 20–21).

How Gelon, after outgeneralling the barbarians, slew some of them and took others captive (chaps. 22–23).

How Gelon, when the Carthaginians sued for peace, exacted money of them and then concluded the peace (chaps. 24–26).

Judgement passed on the Greeks who distinguished themselves in the war (chap. 27).

The battle of the Greeks against Mardonius and the Persians about Plataea and the victory of the Greeks (chaps. 27–39).

The war which the Romans waged against the Aequi and the inhabitants of Tusculum (chap. 40).


Chaeronea: Philip's victory or Alexander's?


Who won Chaeronea? Who should be credited with its victory? I've read different accounts of the battle, but what I find intriguing is Philip's feint. Was it really so, or were his troops actually pushed back? I found Christian Cameron's (a novelist, but a damn good one IMO) account of the battle interesting, in that he places the victory on Alexander's shoulders.

Alexander exploited the weakness of the space that opened up between the Thebans and the Athenians. My reading of the battle indicates that this is similar to what he executed in Gaugamela, by inducing the enemy to open up a gap and then exploiting it by charging into it. This raises the question for me. Was Chaeronea a victory that Alexander won through planning and/or excellent observation? Did he perhaps observe the gap opening and charge through it? Maybe he actually planned to entice the gap?

Was the plan Philip's or was it possibly Alexander's? Chaeronea seems to display the hallmark of tactical genius that Alexander later displayed in so many battles, with his uncanny ability to predict exactly how the enemy would react and how to exploit this. Perhaps Chaeronea was Alexander the Great's first step to military legend, and his first true victory?

Fred Ray

Philip,I think, but the sources do not entirely agree on this one


Who won Chaeronea? Who should be credited with its victory? I've read different accounts of the battle, but what I find intriguing is Philip's feint. Was it really so, or were his troops actually pushed back? I found Christian Cameron's (a novelist, but a damn good one IMO) account of the battle interesting, in that he places the victory on Alexander's shoulders.

Alexander exploited the weakness of the space that opened up between the Thebans and the Athenians. My reading of the battle indicates that this is similar to what he executed in Gaugamela, by inducing the enemy to open up a gap and then exploiting it by charging into it. This raises the question for me. Was Chaeronea a victory that Alexander won through planning and/or excellent observation? Did he perhaps observe the gap opening and charge through it? Maybe he actually planned to entice the gap?

Was the plan Philip's or was it possibly Alexander's? Chaeronea seems to display the hallmark of tactical genius that Alexander later displayed in so many battles, with his uncanny ability to predict exactly how the enemy would react and how to exploit this. Perhaps Chaeronea was Alexander the Great's first step to military legend, and his first true victory?

Who was most responsible for the Macedonian victory at Chaeronea is always going to be a 'you take your pick' question given both the sparseness of the available data and the disparity in opinions/implications in our surviving sources. Diodorus (18.85.2-86.6) gave the nod to Alexander on the Macedonian left wing, though he does not provide any real detail on just how he did it. The idea that the young prince somehow exploited a gap in the Greek line with a cavalry charge is an entirely modern concept, and some researchers (see Rahe and Gaebel below*) have not only disputed that such a thing happened, but have gone on to suggest that horsemen (with or without Alexander, who might well have been with his infantry on that side of the field) played only a very modest role in the engagement.

Plutarch (himself from Chaeronea) credits Alexander with breaking into the Sacred Band (in Alexander), but implies that this was done by his phalangites rather than cavalry in noting that the bodies of those Theban elites lay near to some of the sarissai that killed them (Rahe 1981, p. 85). And crucially, it might seem, he doesn't cite that action as comprising the battle's turning point thus, it might well have been no more than a final bit of drama after the rest of the Greek army had been broken elsewhere on the field. And this last would seem more consistent with all of our other sources.

Those other sources include Justin, who didn't give specific credit either way with regard to the victory, but does indicate that the Greek defeat was significantly due to Athenian inexperience, and the contingent from Athens was apparently standing against Philip. In this same vein, Strabo (9.2.37) mentions only Philip in regard to the battle, completely ignoring any contribution by Alexander. Frontinus (2.1.9) likewise said that the victory was Philip's, noting a long and grueling engagement, giving no credit to Alexander and citing Athenian inexperience as playing a key role. Finally, there is Polyaenus' account (4.2.2,7), which is the source of the false retreat scenario with which he said Philip won the battle. This account is far and away the most detailed one we have in terms of tactics and the flow of the action at Chaeronea, and it clearly gives Philip sole honors for forging the Macedonian victory. Polyaenus' version, for what it's worth, does not conflict with Plutarch and seems well in line with the comments by Justin and Frontinus on a lack of Athenian battle savvy being crucial. It also fits with Herodotus' (7.211) and Plato's (Laches 191 B-C) descriptions of similar false retreat tactics being employed successfully at Thermopylae and Plataea.

So, in the end, picking who might have been responsible for the Macedonian triumph at Chareonea is (as is so very often the case) a matter of which source(s) you prefer to follow, and then how you reconstruct unrecorded elements so as to agree (or at least not conflict) with that source.

Those who prefer to see Alexander winning the day with a cavalry charge must cite Diodorus (and maybe a bit of Plutarch if they can ignore that bit about the sarissai) and construct a cavarly action scenario to fill in the gap left by a lack of specific literature support for such a tack. Alexander winning the day by leading his pikemen to success on the left would be consistent with Diodorus as well (and entirely with Plutarch too), though apparently making a poorer match to the other sources (especially Frontinus and Polyaenus). Those preferring Philip can pretty much follow Polyaenus, who would appear to fit in with all of the other sources save for Diodorus. Here, one might assume that Diodorus was telling the story in a way more reflective of Alexander's ultimate reputation than actual events on the field that day.

As I say, take your pick, you can come up with a variety of plausible scenarios. As to which is the "most likely", that is another matter, and any position will be heavily informed by one's own background and prejudices. I, for example, see almost no similarity in the tactical challenges presented by the overwhelmingly mounted Persian array on open ground at Gaugemela and the terrain-anchored infantry phalanx formed by the Greeks at Chareonea, nor in how those very different challenges were probably overcome. For those and a number of other considerations that loom large in shaping my personal opinion, I'd definitely go with Philip. But that's just me!


Introduction

The last twenty books (XXI–XL) of the Library of History begin with the battle of Ipsus, fought in 301 b.c ., and in their original complete form carried the account down to the author’s own day, closing with the events of 61/0 b.c . 1 Though Diodorus is now held in scant esteem as a historian—in marked contrast to his high repute in the XVIth century—, and though his work is admittedly derivative in character and hence of uneven worth, depending on the reliability of his sources, still the loss sustained by the disappearance of these books is scarcely to be measured in terms of their intrinsic merit. Had they survived intact, they would have given us, as nothing now does, a single, continuous, and detailed narrative of events in the whole Mediterranean world during two and a half crucial centuries, and a historical perspective that we now sadly lack. As it is, no more than a fraction of the original survives, mostly in brief excerpts or, occasionally, in longer but freely condensed paraphrase. Even these sorry fragments, however, preserve the record of many incidents otherwise


Book XXI

the buildings. 1 When the Crotoniates saw this they were frightened, and opening the gate, received Agathocles and his army, who rushed into the city, plundered the houses, and slew the male inhabitants. With the neighbouring barbarians, both the Iapygians and the Peucetians, Agathocles made an alliance and supplied them with pirate ships, receiving in return a share of their booty. Then, leaving a garrison in Croton, he sailed back to Syracuse.

5. Diyllus, the Athenian historian, compiled a universal history in twenty-six books and Psaon of Plataea wrote a continuation of this work in thirty books. 2

6. In the war with the Etruscans, Gauls, Samnites, 295 b.c . and the other allies, the Romans slew one hundred thousand men in the consulship of Fabius, 3 according to Duris.

Something similar 4 is told by Duris, Diodorus, and Dio: that when the Samnites, Etruscans, and the other nations were at war with the Romans, Decius, the Roman consul, colleague of Torquatus, 5 in like manner devoted himself to death, and on that day one hundred thousand of the enemy were slain.


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